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ABSTRACT 
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is a group of militants from Uzbekistan 
established by Uzbek youth who were against the pro-communist government. It is 
tightly connected to the Taliban and was involved in drug trafficking in Afghanistan. 
After an unsuccessful attempt to revolt against the government of Uzbekistan, the party 
was banned, and its members fled the country. Islamic militants tried to change the 
economically and politically weakened governments into an Islamic Caliphate. After 
going through training camps, these militants were formalized into small groups that 
were transported through Iran to Turkey and other Central Asian countries in order to 
create different kinds of radical groups. Their radical ideology spread, such as killing 
infidels and sacrificing themselves for jihad. Decentralization of the IMU has made it 
difficult to track. Through social movement theory (SMT), this thesis examines how the 
IMU is a potential threat to Central Asian states, especially Kazakhstan, by using 
elements of SMT.  
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The Islamic movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) has been an active terrorist 
organization in Central Asia since its formation in 1998. Before that time, it was not 
organized well, and consisted of different unnamed groups. Its original goals were to 
overthrow the pro-communist government of Uzbekistan, especially President Karimov, 
establishing an Islamic Caliphate in Uzbekistan (Fergana Valley) and other Central Asian 
countries.1 After the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan that followed the September 11 attacks 
in New York and Washington, the IMU shifted to the Afghan-Pakistan border. During 
this invasion, its leaders, Juma Namangani and Tahir Yuldashev, were killed in 
November 2001 and in August 2009, respectively, and the group was forced to change its 
location and deviate from its original goal of attacking the Uzbek government. Despite 
those changes, the IMU continues to operate in and around South Waziristan (Pakistan) 
against Coalition Forces in different locations of this region.2 Today, the IMU takes the 
form of a decentralized network that has become stronger and less vulnerable, making it 
hard to target. Even though it was displaced from its original location, the IMU continues 
to gain strength. There is a risk in the future that the IMU will thrive and pose a danger to 
Kazakhstan. 
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to use social movement theory to examine and assess 
the IMU through multiple variables, such as political opportunity, mobilizing structure, 
cultural framing, and its potential threat to Kazakhstan. The IMU is growing as a threat in 
several ways; it is a radicalized terrorist group that has close relations with other terrorist 
groups, such Al-Qaida and the Taliban. Those terrorist groups also have decentralized 
1 Rashid Rashid Ahmed, “Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia” (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2002), 143.  
2 Matthew Stein, “The Goals of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Its Impact on Central Asia 
and the United States,” Foreign Military Studies Office, 
http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/IMU-Goals.pdf. 
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structures now. At the same time, the IMU has been deeply engaged in criminal 
activities, such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and hostage taking, to sustain its 
structure.  
The scope of this thesis will include an examination of the political and economic 
activities that caused instability in Central Asia and gave rise to the IMU. Since the IMU 
was established by Uzbekistan’s youth, specific socio-economic and political conditions 
in Uzbekistan, along with its history, will be major subjects of examination. Other 
bordering countries will also be considered.  
C. METHODOLOGY 
Assessment and evaluation of those terrorist organizations through social 
movement theory will allow analyzing the extent of threat the IMU poses to Kazakhstan. 
Analyzing the actions the IMU conducted in several Central Asian countries and 
considering the current situation where it operates show that it is gaining a growing 
capability to conduct terrorist acts. This thesis will help to determine the potential current 
threat of the IMU in Central Asia and how the IMU in the future may affect Kazakhstan. 
It is worthwhile to assess the IMU because it has a wide network and many ties with 
other terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaida and the Taliban. Terrorist organizations, 
such as Al-Qaida and the Taliban, provide and help the IMU with money, recruitment, 
and safe havens. This evidence can be traced. The Social Movement Theory (SMT) helps 
in analyzing the IMU through variables such as political opportunities, mobilizing 
structures, and cultural framing. We will discuss each of these variables later.  
The variables of social movement theory will be applied to examine a case study 
in which SMT helps analyze the potential threat of a social movement. The case of the 
IMU insurgency from the 1980s to present day was chosen because it offered examples 
of insurgency that developed from a social movement and where government 
successfully targeted the social movement. However, later on the social movement 
gained strength and became a terrorist group. Finally, this thesis concludes with 
suggested policy implementations.  
 2 
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The IMU still is able to conduct terrorist acts in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. As 
recent attacks show, it has gained strength and is able to conduct wide-spectrum terrorist 
acts. Using insights from social movement theory, can we determine whether the IMU 
will pose a significant threat to Kazakhstan in the future?  
Chapter I provides the introduction and defines the research that will be 
performed in this thesis. It starts with a short background of the IMU, identifies the 
purpose and scope of the thesis, and describes the methodology and hypothesis. Chapter 
II presents the extended context of the literature review. It gives full conceptions of the 
emergence of the radical Islam in Central Asia, SMT, and analysis of the geographical 
importance of the Central Asia. Chapter III delivers the IMU analysis through SMT using 
political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes. This chapter shows 
how the IMU has been evolving since its establishment, its strengths and weaknesses, and 
the terrorist acts it has committed. Finally, Chapter IV concludes with a research 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. THE EMERGENCE OF RADICAL ISLAM IN CENTRAL ASIA 
In order to have a broad understanding about the emergence of radical Islam in 
Central Asia, it is best to examine the roots of its emergence. Many empires have risen 
and fallen in the southern part of the Central Asia (specifically, Samarkand and Bukhara, 
present-day Uzbekistan). The Mongols conquered the entire region. Islam was brought to 
the Central Asian region by Arab crusaders approximately 1,400 years ago.3 The Arab 
conquest of the Middle East was much easier than that of Central Asia, where invaders 
met strong resistance and unwillingness to accept Islam as a religion. When the Arab 
leader Kuteiba ibn Muslim tried to convert the Central Asian people to Islam, they 
ignored Islam and were viewed as “infidels” by the Arabs.4 It was not until the ninth 
century that Islam established itself as a dominant religion in the Samarkand and Bukhara 
regions of Uzbekistan, whereas in regions such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Islam had 
no impact at that time, because most of the people in that area had a nomadic lifestyle. 
This fact is essential to underline, because radicalization is based on the religious belief 
of these people. Some tribes and khanates were forced to accept Islam (in present-day 
Uzbekistan region), whereas others accepted it willingly. Some Central Asian tribes had 
such beliefs as Zoroastrianism, Shamanism, and Tengriism (worshipping different kinds 
of symbols). The latter is still prevalent in some Central Asian countries. Arabs struggled 
to introduce Islam to these south Central Asian populations.  
The Arabs used several systems of conversion to Islam, especially a reward 
system. They offered two dirmhams to everyone who attended Friday prayer in the great 
mosque of Bukhara.5 Islam was also disseminated by Muslim merchants and 
missionaries who exposed the population to the religion along the Silk Road.6  
3 Emmanuel Karagiannis, Political Islam in Central Asia: The Challenge of Hizb Ut-Tahrir (New 
York: Routledge, 2009).  
4 Muzafarpur Virkan, “History of the Spread of Islam in Central Asia,” Islam News, 
http://www.islamnews.tj/history.html. 
5 Karagiannis, Political Islam in Central Asia.  
6 Ibid. 
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The mixture of Islam with Persian culture made cities like Bukhara and 
Samarkand the Islamic center of the region, and later on this culture spread to Turkic 
people in the region. In other words, dissemination of Islam in Central Asia started from 
the South and gradually spread to the North. Local people used their own main 
languages, but they also spoke Farsi and Arabic (the language of the Koran).7 Nomadic 
tribes were more difficult targets for Islam, so these tribes adopted a superficial concept 
of that religion. Despite the fact people in some places were forced to embrace Islam, it 
was not radicalized Islam.  
The Mongol Empire, which embraced all of Central Asia and part of Europe, 
united all tribes into one and used Islam as a political weapon to enlarge its territory. In 
fact, many Mongols embraced Islam as their religion, as well. However, no matter how 
fully Islam was embraced by Central Asians, they never had a government based on 
theocracy.  
When Central Asia fell under the influence of the Russian Empire, it did not 
eliminate Islam. In general, the Russian Tsar did not interfere in the religious life of the 
Muslim population. However, he wanted to change the Central Asian governance system 
to be similar to the Russian system.8 Later on, Russia conducted a Russifikatsya policy to 
change thinking in education and polity.  
Closeness between Central Asians and Russians was based primarily on their 
geographical proximity. This is an important point, because it influenced their religious 
life and secularity. The closer a country was geographically to the Russian Empire, the 
more secular the people became. Despite that, Islam has continued to blossom.9  
Notwithstanding the claim that socialism was the main way to move forward, 
religion played an important role for Central Asian Muslims. After the Revolution of 
1917, the Bolsheviks came to power and started enforcing their political ideology—
communism. They did not tolerate any religion, including Islam, and tried to eliminate all 
7 Ronald Z. Sagdeev and Susan Eisenhower, Islam and Central Asia: An Enduring Legacy or an 
Evolving Threat? (Washington, DC: Center for Political & Strategic Studies, 2000), 7. 
8 Mehrdad Haghayeghi, Islam and Politics in Central Asia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 75. 
9 Sagdeev and Eisenhower, Islam and Central Asia, 8.  
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forms of religion, which became the beginning of the suppression of the people who 
wanted to keep their religious life. Bolsheviks subjugated Islamic clergymen and 
destroyed many mosques and religious schools.10 For the Bolsheviks, religion was “the 
opium of the masses” and, by definition, the enemy of the population. Pan-Islamism and 
pan-Turkism were the main concern of Bolsheviks because these both might merge and 
create an obstacle to Bolshevik success. Bolsheviks conducted their anti-religious 
campaigns for atheism in Muslim regions. The Communist Party controlled even the 
nominations of religious leaders.   
Under these circumstances, part of the clergy joined the Basmachi movement 
against Soviet suppression and used guerilla tactics. Basmachi fought against infidels 
who were Bolsheviks in an attempt to overthrow them. This was the first time the Central 
Asian Muslims declared Jihad.11 It was not radicalized Islam, but a reaction to 
Bolsheviks trying to terminate them. In fact, Enver Pasha, the former Ottoman War 
Minister and Commander-in-Chief during the First World War, joined the Central Asian 
Muslim Basmachi rebellion in 1921, though the rebellion was defeated later by 
communists in 1928.12 Yet some sources say that this rebellion lasted until 1938 in some 
parts of Central Asia. Lenin, who came into power as a result of The Revolution of 1917, 
declared: 
Muslims of Russia, Tatars of Crimea and Volga, Kirgiz (Bolsheviks called 
Kazakhs Kirgiz to have a clear distinction between Kazak and Kazakh) 
and Sarts of Siberia and Turkistan, Turks and Tatars of Transcaucasia, 
Chechen and Mountain Peoples of Caucasus, and all you whose mosques 
and prayer houses have been destroyed, whose beliefs and customs have 
been trampled upon by the Tsars and oppressors of Russia: Your beliefs 
and usages, your national and cultural institutions are forever free and 
inviolate. Know that your rights, like those of all people of Russia, are 
under the mighty protection of the Revolution and its organs, the Soviet of 
Workers, Soldiers, and Peasants.13  
10 Sagdeev and Eisenhower, Islam and Central Asia, 9. 
11 Yusupov Timur, “Basmachi - Mujahideen of the Civil War,” Ansar, 
http://www.ansar.ru/history/2011/03/06/12366.  
12 Ibid. 
13 Karagiannis, Political Islam in Central Asia, 8.       
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However, his declaration was not authentic. The Bolsheviks continued to enforce 
their policy. In the end, five of the Soviet Socialist Republics (SSR) were created: The 
SSR of Uzbekistan was formed in 1924, the SSR of Turkmenistan in 1925, the SSR of 
Tajikistan in 1929, and the SSR of Kirgiza and Kazakhstan (the Soviets called Kazakhs 
Kirgiz-Kaisak to differentiate between Russian Kazak and Central Asian Kazakh) in 
1936.14 In addition, Moscow forced Central Asian Muslims to change from Arabic script 
to Latin, and in 1940, to change to Cyrillic.15 Turkey also followed that policy. In 1927, 
it declared that sharia courts were abolished in Central Asian republics. Religious 
activities such as fasting and circumcision also were declared unhealthy by the Soviets.  
For the Soviet Union, World War II began in 1941, followed by an unexpected 
Nazi invasion. Nazis conducted a propaganda campaign by calling on Central Asian 
Muslims to join them and fight against atheist Bolsheviks. As a result, Stalin softened his 
oppression of Muslims. In 1943, Stalin established the Spiritual Board of Central Asian 
Muslims in Uzbekistan. It functioned as the official, Soviet-approved governing 
agency.16 Those agencies were established in the Caucasus and in Siberia also, because 
other Muslim populations lived there. During Khrushev’s time, Islam was an important 
tool for the Soviet government because it was used as a connection to other Muslims 
worlds; it made it easier for Soviet Union leaders to succeed politically with Arab 
countries. During this time, Islamic radicalization began, and underground madrasahs 
began reviving Islam. Underground Islamic organizations infiltrated social organizations 
and political parties.17 The pressure from authorities on religions decreased under 
Gorbachev when he enforced perestroika and glasnost policies, and such policies allowed 
the rebuilding of the first wave of mosques. Radical Islam actively participated in 
political activity, especially in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, where it played a critical role 
in, and became one of the factors of, destabilization.   
14 Ibid.  
15 “All Stages of Kazakh History,” YouTube video, 34:56, posted by Mordvin Mordvinov, March 16, 
2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=94p-hpoZ9NU.  
16 Karagiannis, Political Islam in Central Asia.      
17 “Islam and Authority in Post-Soviet Central Asia,” http://www.stanradar.com/news/full/3575-islam-
i-vlast-v-postsovetskoj-tsentralnoj-azii.html.      
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During perestroika, all Islamic organizations became a kind of democratic power 
against communism. Later, however, those organizations started to fight against political 
opponents. Organizations were composed of religious extremists and fundamentalists. 
For example, one of the causes of civil war in Tajikistan was religious factions. All 
political spaces were filled by international Islamic organizations, which were influenced 
by Wahhabis and fundamentalism. In post-Soviet time, each country had its own different 
direction regarding Islam.18 In Tajikistan, activation of an Islamic organization resulted 
in civil war. In Uzbekistan, the same activation ended up in violent suppression by the 
government, and most of the spiritual leaders ran away to neighboring countries. In other 
Central Asian countries, those kinds of organizational activities were banned.  
After the collapse of the USSR, all of the Central Asian republics, except 
Kazakhstan, suffered critical socioeconomic conditions. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
suffered most in the economic sphere, because all subsidies were coming from 
Moscow.19 However, all Central Asian societies had weak liberal values in freedom of 
speech and freedom to vote (especially for religious people). The government was not 
able to control a market economy and its own identity. Rapid radicalization started. 
Undereducated youth attended mosques and underground religious organizations where 
they often became victims of manipulation by spiritual Wahhabis, Salafists, and other 
radical leaders.20 They were taught the government was an enemy and anyone who did 
not support Islam was already perverted. These youths gradually became the participants 
of the active life of the Central Asian republics, as there were no highly-qualified 
religious leaders who could teach them about genuine Islam.  
The major bodies of knowledge and theory that will inform this thesis are social 
movement theory and radical movements in Central Asia. Initially, the IMU had a 
religious character, and therefore, it is important to recall and consider different 
interpretations and conceptions of Islam, both the genuine and the radicalized one.    
18 “Islam and Authority in Post-Soviet Central Asia,” Stan Radar, 
http://www.stanradar.com/news/full/3575-islam-i-vlast-v-postsovetskoj-tsentralnoj-azii.html.  
19 “Who Has a Better Life after the Soviet Union Collapsed?” NV Online, http://www.nv-
online.info/by/239/printed/40291/.   
20 “Islam and Authority in Post-Soviet Central Asia.”   
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Ahmed Rashid describes the birth of militant Islam, its roots, expansion, and the 
meaning of Jihad.21 Militancy was not essential Jihad. Unlike before, today radical 
Islamist terrorist groups such as the Taliban and Al Qaida ignore the greater concept of 
jihad advocated by the prophet. The author especially explains that religious repression, 
depressed economic conditions, political corruption, and the Soviet Union’s collapse 
created an appealing platform for militant Islamic fundamentalism.  
Sagdiyev and Eisenhower illustrate how Islam has survived after all the 
suppression under Soviet rule.22 The authors point out that the culture of moderate and 
tolerant Islam, which developed in Central Asia throughout its history along with the 
Russian and Soviet educational system, could hardly accept the extremes of Islamic 
revolution. Even relations between the Soviet Union and Iran were good.23 They point 
out how lack of education concerning pure Islam could be one of the many factors that 
formed militant Islam. All arguments go to the roots, where Islamic extremism comes 
from Saudi Arabian Wahhabis, who have a radical interpretation of Islam. The key 
factors were economic crises in those regions that helped fuel Islamic radicals. The 
authors’ final comment is that without a greater international—in particular, U.S. 
commitment—to try to end the Afghan civil war, the Central Asian region will become 
more divergent and radicalized.24  
Hooman Peimani explains how extremist groups in the central Asian countries 
arose because of rampant poverty, a low standard of living, widespread corruption, and 
extensive human rights abuses lead to extremist ideologies.25 However, it is not the only 
explanation. Burghart and Sabonis-Helf express their viewpoint concerning the 
emergence and growth of radicalism in the post-communist era. A majority of Central 
Asian Muslims do not support radical Islam; however, the increasing phenomenon of 
radicalization is a foreign influence, paralleled by corruption, oppression, and economic 
21 Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia.   
22 Sagdeev and Eisenhower, Islam and Central Asia, 8.   
23 Ibid.  
24 Ibid.   
25 Hooman Peimani, Conflict and Security in Central Asia and the Caucasus (Santa Barbara, CA: 
ABC-CLIO, 2009), 351.    
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deterioration.26 In the face of ongoing wars against global terrorism, Central Asian 
republics offer various degrees of assistance to the United States. As in Oliver Roy’s 
book, Burghart and Sabonis-Helf agree that the Soviet-Afghan war made its contribution 
to creating more radicals, where Central Asian Muslims encountered another type of the 
more desperate form of Islam.27 In addition, Gorbachev’s reforms led to religious 
thriving in which many Central Asian Muslims were allowed make a pilgrimage to Saudi 
Arabia. Reforms allowed foreign Islamic governments to fund building mosques. In 
Kazakhstan, the population was less religious and less radically Islamized than in either 
Uzbekistan or Tajikistan; however, there were some arrests related to distribution of His-
but Tahir’s literature. 
Over time, Islam has changed and has been used by people as an instrument to 
reach their political goals. Misinterpretation of Islam has created many radical branches. 
Suppression and banning of Islam only made it stronger, and fueled the emergence of 
radical Islam. As was discussed previously, key factors such as nomadic culture and 
Soviet ideology influenced the religious life of Central Asian countries and Kazakhstan. 
Kazakhstan has taken the terrorist threat seriously. In December 2012, President 
Nazarbayev said, “the secular nature of Kazakhstan is a crucial prerequisite for the 
nation’s further progress.”28 The security threats in Kazakhstan are tied to regional 
developments. If Kazakhstan’s neighbors in Central Asia—including Xinjiang in China 
and the Ural region in Russia—remain stable, Kazakhstan will be able to resist the 
increasingly complex and dangerous radical Islamists in Eurasia, which will likely arise 
after the U.S. war in Afghanistan and the Syrian Civil War. 
26 Dan Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf, “In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia’s Path to the 
Twenty‐first Century,” European Security 11, no. 3 (2002): 143.  
27 Burghart and Sabonis-Helf, “In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia’s Path to the Twenty‐first 
Century,” 1–19.    




                                                 
B. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY  
SMT appears between structuralist and rational choice theories.29 Those schools 
have different units of analysis. Structural theorists tend to examine large units of 
analysis, such as international systems and state levels.30 According to this theory, no 
single individual, group, or class purposely organizes or reproduces complex determined 
conflicts that may cause revolutions and other global political crisis. So, structuralists 
simply deny that deliberate human actions lead to large political outcomes.31 For 
example, the Russian Revolution was not made by the proletariat class or the Bolsheviks, 
and Lenin as a leader in this case only contributed to the revolution in Russia in 1917, but 
did not play a vital role in the historically necessary trend of state-led industrialization in 
Russia.32  
In contrast, the rational choice theory performs analysis on an individual level, 
and denies other theories. Rational choice theory considers the structuralist approach as 
pleonastic and redundant, and without precise concepts. For its supporters, any collective 
actions, systems, and groups make their decisions based on an individual’s decisions, and 
those individuals’ strategic relationships with each other help to understand collective 
actions. Nothing is important, except the individual.33  
Unlike the aforementioned two theories mentioned, SMT emphasizes groups in 
examining collective action. While accepting that in rational choice theory individuals 
play an important role, SMT still argues that individuals cannot be separated from the 
contingent where other people, networks, and groups exist. Because an individual’s 
29 Glenn E. Robinson, “Hamas as Social Movement,” in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory 
Approach, ed. Quinton Wiktorowicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 112‒139.   
30 Ibid.  
31 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and 
China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979).   
32 Jack A. Goldstone, “Is Revolution Individually Rational? Groups and Individuals in Revolutionary 
Collective Action,” Rationality and Society 6, no. 1 (1994): 200.   
33 Robinson, “Hamas as Social Movement.”   
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decision making cannot be accepted without those groups, the proper unit of analysis is 
the group.34  
SMT has different models, such as the Classical Model of SMT, Resource 
Mobilization, and Political Process. The Classical Model initially was focused on the 
structural and psychological causes of mass mobilization, rather than political causes. A 
psychological sense of isolation and weakness in the face of broad social changes was 
supposed to shift individuals to join social movements.35 The Resource Mobilization 
theory is more concentrated on the mobilization process and the formal organizational 
manifestation of these processes, and its psychological aspects were ignored.36 The 
Political Process model, an alternative to both previously mentioned models, conveys two 
insights that include the perspectives of both models. First, it contains and expresses a 
political phenomenon rather than a psychological one. Second, movements represent 
long-term processes rather than many separate, developmental levels.37  
The political process model focuses on three major factors. The first one is 
political opportunity, which analyzes the historical and current context of a movement. 
The second one is resource mobilization, based on the capacity and ability to mobilize 
given internal and external dynamics. The last one is the framing process, which 
generates resonance and support for mobilization. These three factors will be discussed in 
more detail.   
C. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY  
“Social movements and revolutions are shaped by the broader set of political 
constraints and opportunities unique to national context in which they are embedded,” 
observes Doug McAdam.38 Collective action is built on available political opportunities. 
34 Robinson, “Hamas as Social Movement.”     
35 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930‒1970 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982), 18. 
36 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996).    
37 McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 36.     
38 McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, 3.    
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The political structure in the environment in which the movements occur promotes or 
constrains events based on the actions and attitudes of the supporters of that structure. 
During protests, changes occur not only among inactive or conventionally directed 
groups, but in the political system in which they exist. Any events or broad social 
processes—such as demographic changes, wars, industrialization, continuous 
unemployment—that lead to change in status quo of a certain system is a window to 
political opportunity.39 Classical theorists may argue that industrialization also creates a 
strain which could cause a collective action. However, its action will be a directed one 
and follows an immediate movement emergence.40  
Political opportunity has elements that send signals to political and social actors to 
facilitate or form social movements. Political opportunity underlines not only state 
institutions, but also alliance structures. There are four types of signals: an opening of 
access to power, a shifting alignment, the availability of influential allies, and cleavages 
within and among elites.41 In the first, the opening up of political access, rational people 
will not attack an opponent when they do not have an opportunity. For instance, in the 
late 1980s, perestroika gave an opportunity for people to create political action and 
organize protest movements. The second signal is unstable alignment, perhaps connected 
to electoral instability. When a new coalition is created, elites may seek provisions from 
outside, inducing an insurgency to exercise its power.42 Peasants revolted in the First 
Russian revolution when they saw rebelling against authority was an auspicious step, 
creating a door of opportunity to a hierarchical system.43 Even though the peasants could 
not get everything they demanded, they gained more confidence for the next uprisings. 
They already had solidarity and an “indigenous network.”  
The third aspect of political opportunity is influential allies. This is vital because 
influential allies can act as friends and protectors against authoritarian government, or as 
39 Peter K. Eisinger, “The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities,” The American Political 
Science Review (1973): 11‒28.      
40 McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency.    
41 McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, 54.   
42 Ibid.   
43 “History of Russia,” History Notes, http://historynotes.ru/revolyutsiya-1905-1907-godov/.    
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rational negotiators.44 Gorbachev declared to the communist regimes of Eastern Europe 
that elites of those countries could not rely upon the Red Army, which was an open signal 
for insurgents to organize their social protests. The fourth aspect of political opportunity 
is divided elites. Conflict among elites always propels opposing groups to engage in 
collective action. Divided elites are a stimulus for unrepresented, resource-poor groups 
and are a boost to hold a “tribune of the people” in order to attain their political goals.45 
D. MOBILIZING STRUCTURE 
Social movements do not only depend on political opportunity. In order to 
confront an opponent, they have to have a cohesive mobilized mass. Sometimes social 
movements are able to mobilize, but sometimes not. McAdam describes mobilizing 
structures as “collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people 
mobilize and engage in collective action.”46 That is, they serve as the methods and ways 
a movement organizes, shapes, and builds its membership. The majority of these have 
been the resource-mobilizing theories mentioned earlier. The ability to raise material 
resources and mobilize masses will have a direct effect on activists’ common goals to 
succeed.47 Mobilizing structures could be formal and informal social institutions. 
Furthermore, these structures occurs in everyday life in social situations, such as family 
units, friendship networks, voluntary associations, religious networks (people in churches 
or mosques), and work networks. Distinguishing among four types of formal 
organizations helps to understand mobilizing structure. These types are social movement 
organizations (SMOs), movement associations, supportive organizations, and parties and 
interest groups. SMOs have criteria, such as mobilizing the public for collective action, 
and they conduct these activities for political goals. Second, movement associations are 
created by the movements themselves in order to supply members’ needs. They are self-
44 William A. Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1975).     
45 McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements.   
46 Ibid.    
47 Ibid., 143. 
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help organizations, clubs, and voluntary associations. “Creation of commitment” and 
“consensus mobilization” is indirect contributions of the movement associations.48  
Organizations such as churches, mosques, educational institutions, and media do 
their job without direct involvement in mobilization for collective action. Those 
organizations may contribute by sympathizing and sharing grievances, but they would be 
indirect action. The fourth one is parties and interest groups. They have political goals, 
but they do not directly participate.49  
Leaders contribute to mobilization of the masses. Leaders can be people-oriented 
or task-oriented. Task-oriented leaders are “pragmatic” or “rationalized” leaders. People-
oriented leaders direct their effort to evoking an emotional state in people to motivate 
them to become devoted to a particular movement. Some scholars have distinguished a 
difference between autocratic and democratic leaders. They say autocratic leaders are 
task-oriented and democratic leaders are people-oriented.50 However, leaders are not a 
vitally important part of a social movement, and by themselves are impotent.  
When movements are not able to obtain resources, third-party intervention may 
occur. Since this assessment considers the group that developed in an authoritarian post-
Soviet country, Uzbekistan, the emphasis inclines towards an autocratic regime rather 
than a democratic one. As in every society, interpersonal relationships play a crucial role 
even in a repressive regime. Political organizations that were banned transform into 
underground organizations that operate covertly. They are not able to operate overtly 
because there are no opportunities for a mobilizing process.51 Repression also contributes 
to the mobilizing structure. State repression could be selective when it targets only 
leaders of social movements. Nonetheless, when it starts to target everybody, including 
48 Bert Klandermans and Sidney Tarrow, “Mobilization into Social Movements: Synthesizing 
European and American Approaches,” International Social Movement Research 1, no. 1 (1988): 1‒38.   
49 McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements.    
50 Ron Aminzade, Jack A. Goldstone, and Elizabeth J. Perry, “Leadership Dynamics and Dynamics of 
Contention,” in Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 126‒154.  
51 Maryjane Osa, “Networks in Opposition: Linking Organizations through Activists in the Polish 
People’s Republic,” in Social Movements and Networks (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2003), 77‒104.    
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supporters, sympathizers, and other innocent people it becomes indiscriminate 
repression.52 In fact, indiscriminate repression may push occasional activist supporters of 
the social movements to seek the protection of radical groups. The civil war in Tajikistan 
demonstrates how Islamic opposition gained popular support because of the state’s brutal 
repression.53 For a community where mosques play a crucial role in terms of 
mobilization, it is a similar to the role of churches in the civil-rights movement in the 
United States.54 Since mosques have legal rights to teach “pure Islam” governments 
mostly do not scrutinize them. However, in recent years regimes have broadened their 
control over religious institutions.  
In some countries, groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas provide social services to 
the population in order to sustain existences. Islamic non-government organizations 
provide basic needs, such as medical clinics, charity societies, and cultural centers, and 
send messages to the population,55 especially in poor communities where people need 
help. All of these efforts not only help the population, but participation itself unites 
individuals and social interaction happens. Every group develops a method of attracting 
people, as Islamic radicals present their friendly face to the public, which gives them an 
opportunity to avoid confrontation with a regime.56   
Student associations and professional affiliations are also used by Islamic activists 
to mobilize the masses. After the decline of leftist ideology, many Islamic movements 
have controlled a variety of institutions and associations in order to use them to disperse 
messages.57  
52 Mohammed Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).   
53 Ibid.    
54 Aldon Morris and Cedric Herring, “Theory and Research in Social Movements: A Critical Review,” 
Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1984): 137‒193. 
55 Quinton Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2004).     
56 Janine A. Clark, Islam, Charity, and Activism: Middle-Class Networks and Social Welfare in Egypt, 
Jordan, and Yemen (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004).   
57 Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism and Political Change in Egypt 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).   
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Mobilizing through political parties can be useful. It still can work in democratic 
societies, but in autocratic states, it may become a problem. In many countries, such as 
Jordan, Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Yemen, political parties have gained more 
success in municipal and parliamentary elections.58 However, they could easily be 
banned by authoritarian regimes. The importance of social networks under high-risk 
activism only strengthens social ties, trust, and solidarity and encourages individuals to 
join in the activism.59 Use of informal organizations and institutions for mobilization is 
prevalent in less liberal societies, where a government is dominated by autocratic features 
and democracy is invisible. An autocratic regime controls every segment of a political 
sphere, and a group or movement becomes a target for repression. It is reasonable to use 
an informal mobilizing structure in order for the movement to succeed, because it is 
invulnerable and out of a state’s control.60 
E. FRAMING PROCESS 
McAdam defines the framing process “as mediating between opportunity, 
organization, and action with the shared meanings and definitions that people bring to 
their situation.”61 The shared understanding of the world and themselves by a group of 
individuals, their common ideology, leads them to attain a common goal.62 Culture and 
ideology are components of the framing process. Culture is the understandings and 
shared beliefs referred by some symbols and language of a particular group. Ideology is 
the system of ideals that forms the foundation of political theory and policy. In the 
framing process, actors play important roles in generating frames, and they can be related 
to different audiences inside and outside of movements. Political opportunity and 
mobilizing structure interconnect to shape the outcomes of the framing process.63   
58 Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach.     
59 McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements.    
60 Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach.   
61 McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 5.   
62 Ibid.   
63 McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements.   
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“Frames are the specific metaphors, symbolic representations, and cognitive cues 
used to render or cast behavior and events in an evaluative mode and to suggest 
alternative modes of action,” interprets McAdam. Ideologies and beliefs leave huge 
footprints in history, especially when they have been used in movements and revolutions. 
The framing process is a trigger mechanism to create core beliefs. For example, Nazi 
Germany used a swastika flag that became a symbol of egotism. The Nazis narrative was 
about “The Aryan Race,” where other nations and peoples were considered as subhuman. 
Hitler, who was leader of the Nazis, always talked publicly about and addressed his 
audience concerning the presumed superiority of the Aryan Race.64 All these elements 
are important in the framing process, and in the absence of one, it might not work. The 
Al-Qaida terrorist group leader Osama Bin Laden, used narratives—such as Islam is the 
only solution, defense for the Muslim, vilification of the U.S., and how unjust they were. 
Framing processes show what injustice is, and demonize or canonize a target.65 They are 
able to convert likeminded individuals to favor evil. There are many ways how framing 
processes work, and they may be through face-to face interaction or media—magazines, 
books, newspapers, radio, Internet, and television. A platform for the framing processes 
may be cafes, restaurants, meeting halls, pubs, or any places for socializing and 
interacting. On the cognitive level, the perception of acquired information through 
newspapers and TV is different.66 The media is more likely to evoke an emotional 
response through using images, sounds, and videos. In democratic societies, it is easier to 
act, because there are not as many constraints as in autocratic regimes, where media and 
newspapers are strictly controlled. For example, communist ideology in the Soviet Union 
was as effective as the Nazi propaganda in Germany. Children were brainwashed since 
childhood. TV transmitted patriotic movies where the Russian soldiers fought against 
Nazis, and the capitalist West was considered as a threat.67 To his audience, Martin 
64 V.V. Naumkin, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Between Pen and Rifle (New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2005). 
65 Ibid. 
66 McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, 271.  
67 “10 Disturbing Pieces of Nazi Propaganda,” Master of Education.org, http://www.master-of-
education.org/10-disturbing-pieces-of-nazi-education-propaganda/.  
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Luther King used emotional rhetoric, where African-American religious culture 
embraced in rhetoric, and resonated in American political themes.68 There are three 
essential framing tasks for social movements. First, movements build frames that identify 
a state as a problem that is needed to be restored. This comprises an attribution of 
responsibilities and targets of blame. Second, movements develop solutions to these 
problems, which consist of tactics and strategies directed to eliminate injustice.69  
David A. Snow, Robert Benford, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., and Steven K. Worden 
rank frame resonance as the most critical dimension of the framing process for a 
movement. The transformation of mobilization potential into a real mobilization is a 
contribution of frame resonance.70 This reverberation depends on not only its community 
with a cultural narrative, but also the reputation of those who are responsible for 
enunciating the frames. 
As in many other social movements followed by identity issues, culture, and post-
materialism, Islamic movements are involved in struggles over meanings and values. The 
goals of many Islamic movements are to create an Islamic state under an Islamic law 
(sharia). However, in order to build that state, movements should have credibility. One of 
the methods to build credibility is framing processes.  
The framing process contributes to the mobilization process by its framing core 
tasks of diagnostics, prognostics, and motivational framings. Diagnostic framing focuses 
on the issues by diagnosing some aspect of social life or the system of government as a 
problem that needs to be repaired or restored, and attributes blaming or responsibility. It 
tries to answer the questions “What went wrong?” and “Who or what is to blame?” 
Blaming the Western values that help the current regime responsible for a dwindling 
economy and rising unemployment are crucial components of the diagnostic frame.71 For 
example, humanitarian aid from the United States and Western countries to Afghanistan 
68 McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements.  
69 Robert D. Benford, “Frame Disputes within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement,” Social Forces 
71, no. 3 (1993): 677–701.    
70 Ibid. 
71 Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach.  
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and Iraq were represented as an invasion and subjugation of the motherland. Prognostic 
framing mainly addresses the problem of action and mobilization by stipulating solutions 
and the tactics for achieving these objectives. The prognostic framing addresses the 
question, “What is to be done?” From Osama bin Laden to his Al-Qaeda followers: 
We—with God’s help—call on every Muslim … to kill the Americans and 
plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it. We also call on 
Muslim ulema, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan’s 
U.S. troops and the devil’s supporters allying with them, and to displace 
those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson.72 
Motivational framing is “the elaboration of a call to arms or rationale for action 
that goes beyond the diagnosis and prognosis.”73 Discontent with the regime is not 
enough for people to risk their lives. A strong commitment needs to overcome the fear. 
The Iranian Revolution is a good example of cleric leaders who played a vital role in 
motivational framing. It was portrayed as the equivalent of a “Holy War,” and that death 
is a reward of “martyrdom.”74 Similarly, bin Laden’s interest in religious duty and 
commitment during his 1998 fatwa, stated, “[T]he ruling to kill Americans and their 
allies … is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is 
possible to do it.”75  
During Islamic movements, most framing happens in mosques. In mosques, 
people interrelate with one another face-to-face and with imams, who are able to easily 
shape people’s minds through emotional rhetoric. The religious literature, interpreted by 
radical Islamists, is very effective. All of these features contribute to establish a loyalty. 
Poor economic conditions alone cannot be a trigger for Islamic activism, because many 
terrorist leaders are not poor. For instance, Osama Bin Laden, who led Al-Qaida, was one 
of the richest men in the world. Many deprived people live happy lives in rural areas of a 
72 David A. Snow and Scott C. Byrd, “Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist 
Movements,” Mobilization: An International Quarterly 12, no. 2 (2007), 119–136.   
73 Ibid.   
74 Ibid.    
75 Ibid.   
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country. The framing processes transform and shape all these elements into collective 
action.  
F. ANALYSIS OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL IMPORTANCE IN CENTRAL 
ASIA  
The greatest advantage in Central Asia’s landlocked territory in the past was that 
it bordered Afghanistan and Iran to the south, China to the east, and Russia to the north 
and the west. A bulk of the black gold of the Caspian Sea that borders with the Central 
Asian steppe, the Hindu Kush, Pamir, and Tian Shan ranges, make this region more 
attractive and unattainable.76 In the north, the Kazakh steppe merges into Siberia with no 
clear geographical limitations. “The land between two rivers “the Amu Darya (Oxus) and 
Sir Darya (Jaxartes) was once named Central Asia. Those two rivers played an important 
geographical, political, and cultural role in this region. For instance, the Amu Darya 
separated the nomadic Turkic and Mongol empires from the Persian Empire. Sir Darya 
protected Central Asian khanates from systematic incursion by other tribes.77 The Pamir 
Mountains, which mostly cover Tajikistan and the Tian Shan Mountains stretching to the 
east and north of the Pamir, the Himalayas to the southeast, and Hindu Kush to the south, 
created a formidable fortress for some tribes to protect against external invasion. Along 
with rivers and mountains, there are two of the largest deserts in the world. One is Kara-
Kum (Black Sands) Desert in Turkmenistan, and the other is Kyzyl-Kum (Red Sands) 
Desert in Uzbekistan. The sparsely populated land made Central Asia attractive for 
conquest, but difficult to rule: Empires were begun and ended systematically within its 
history;78 however, its terrain remains forever.   
The Russian Empire absorbed much of Central Asia, but it did not physically 
change Central Asia. Such changes did not occur until the Soviet Union emerged. The 
Soviets changed the landscape, buildings, irrigation networks, and industrial institutions. 
During the World War II many people from Eastern Europe and the Caucasus were 
transported into the heart of Central Asia, especially Kazakhstan.  




                                                 
In terms of religion, the geographical conditions made it difficult for Islam to 
spread. Under Soviet rule assimilation of ethnic groups played a vital role in terms of 
secularism and religious activity of these groups. Although Kazakhstan was the most 
secular state within Central Asia, its ethnic diversity was displayed through more than 
130 ethnic groups.79 Also, the Russians tried to remove religion from politics, because 
once the population embraces a religion, it is easy to manipulate and use as an 
“instrument” of war against any government.   
In Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, there were fewer numbers of Russians, indicating 
that these countries were located further away from Russia. In these countries religion 
played a crucial role in the lives of their citizens. The closer states were located to the 
Russia, the more secular they were. 
79 Embassy of the Republic of the Kazakhstan. “Ethnic Groups,” Globescope, 
http://www.kazakhembus.com/page/ethnic-groups.     
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III. THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF UZBEKISTAN 
INSURGENCY 
A. BACKGROUND 
The IMU is a group of militants from Uzbekistan, other Central Asian states, and 
Europe. In 1991, as a party, it was comprised of approximately 500 members.80 It was 
established by Uzbek youth who were against the pro-communist government. Tohir 
Yuldashev (Figure 1), a 24-year-old local mullah and college dropout, was a brilliant 
speaker who led the young men against Uzbekistan’s communist and later pro-
communist government. Another IMU leader was 22-year-old Jumaboi Khojaev, who 
later adopted the pseudonym Juma Namangani. He was a formidable man in terms of 
military strategies and tactics. In 1987, Namangani served as a conscript in the Soviet 
Army in Afghanistan as a paratrooper, where he gained admiration from Afghan 
Mujahedeen who fought against the Soviets.81 Yuldashev and Namangani were founding 
leaders of the IMU.82  
 
 
Figure 1.  Tahir Yuldashev, IMU leader.83 
80 UN site research. “The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,” 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQE01001E.shtml.  
81 Ahmed, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia.     
82 Tuyluoglu Mazhar, “The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,” Middle East Technical University, 
Eurasia Studies. n.d,. n.p,. 
http://www.academia.edu/1214053/The_Islamic_Movement_of_Uzbekistan_IMU_.  
83 “Tahir Yuldashev,” http://occident.blogspot.com/2010/09/in-pictures-waziristan-connections-
ii.html.  
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In 2000, the IMU was listed by the U.S. State Department as a terrorist 
organization. It was tightly connected to the Taliban, and was involved in drug trafficking 
from Afghanistan to other Central Asian states, though the Taliban back then opposed the 
drug trade. Before the IMU was established, its members created a party called Adolat 
(justice), and tried to overthrow the secular president of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov 
(Figure 2), and establish an Islamic Caliphate. In 1992, after unsuccessful attempts to 




Figure 2.  Islam Karimov, president of Uzbekistan.84 
When the civil war broke out in Tajikistan in 1992, Yuldashev left Tajikistan for 
Afghanistan, while Namangani was fighting in the civil war.85 Islamic militants tried to 
seize the opportunity within the economically and politically weakened governments to 
change them into an Islamic Caliphate. In 1998, Yuldashev arrived in Kabul, where he 
was given a house by Mullah Omar and Bin Laden. Together, they announced the 
creation of the IMU, and declared Jihad against the Karimov regime.86 The Islamization 
policy could not be stopped in Uzbekistan because the Soviet Union collapsed, and there 
were no longer any restrictions from Moscow. On February 16, 1999, in attempt to 
84 “President Karimov,” Tumblr, https://www.tumblr.com/search/omar+al-bashir.  
85 Ahmed, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, 140.    
86 Ibid., 148. 
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assassinate the president, the IMU members exploded six car bombs in Tashkent. There 
were also armed clashes with police forces on Independence Square—meant to be one of 
the most secure places. Because of these attacks, 13 people were killed, and 128 were 
injured.87 In August 1999, Namangani sent some of his loyal men into Kyrgyz plain, 
where many Kyrgyz enclaves were located. Those men kidnapped a mayor and three 
officials of a small village west of Osh. They demanded one million dollars in ransom, 
and a helicopter to get into Afghanistan. The terrorists got what they wanted, and the 
Kyrgyz government paid them $50,000 in ransom. President Karimov was angry and 
disappointed about the Kyrgyz act, and sent Uzbek bombers to attack towns of Tavildara 
and Garm, where Namanagni lived. As a result, there were many civilian casualties 
including Tajik people.88 
In 2001, the IMU became a powerful military organization with 10,000 members 
stationed in Afghanistan.89 It was able to conduct a full-spectrum of combat operations in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan regions. The IMU had modern weaponry, anti-aircraft missiles, 
and armored vehicles, such as Boevaya Mashina Pehoty (BMPs) and Bronyetransportyers 
(BTRs), and rocket launchers, including the RSZO-BM ‘Grad.’90 The IMU militants 
were experienced in guerilla warfare, especially fighting in mountainous areas. Its 
military infrastructure included training camps in Afghan provinces—such as Mazari-
Sharif, Kunduz, and Kabul—where recruits went through training camps, and formed 
into smaller groups.91 The most skilled recruits had the chance to train in Al-Qaida camps 
in Afghanistan.92  
87 “1999 Bombings in Tashkent: Terrorist Attack of Islamists or Special Services.” Fergana news, last 
modified February 16, 2012, http://www.fergananews.com/articles/7280.  
88 Ibid.    
89 Said Amin, “Survivability of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,” Eastern Time, last modified 
July 29, 2013, http://easttime.ru/analytics/uzbekistan/zhivuchest-islamskogo-dvizheniya-uzbekistana/4460.  
90 “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,” Analitika.org, last modified February 2012. http://analitika.org.   
91 “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,” last modified February 2012, http://analitika.org. 
92 Ruzaliev Odil, “The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: Lines to Complete the Portrait,” Central 
Asia and the Caucasus, http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/the-islamic-movement-of-uzbekistan-lines-to-
complete-the-portrait.  
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The IMU paid recruits $100 to $500 per month, based on their tasks. To support 
the IMU, money was received from Al-Qaida, international terrorist organizations, and 
the Uzbek diaspora in Saudi Arabia.93 The terrorist organizations sometimes clashed with 
local criminals, who were also involved in drug trafficking. These types of clashes 
exacerbated instability in Afghanistan. Because the IMU and the Taliban were connected 
to each other, the latter helped with provision.94 It is known Yuldashev took an oath of 
allegiance to Taliban leader Mullah Omar.95 Both terrorist organizations were deeply 
involved in drug trafficking.  
In 2002, Namangani trained terrorists and planned to invade Uzbekistan. 
However, in 2001, Namangani was killed by the U.S. and Coalition Forces that invaded 
Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks.96 Unable to withstand the U.S. offensives, 
Yuldashev relocated the IMU fighters to the Waziristan Federally Administrated Tribal 
Area (FATA).97 In August 2009, the second IMU leader, Yuldashev, was the next killed 
by a U.S. drone attack. Some sources say that when those two leaders were killed, the 
next leader of the IMU became Usman Adil (Figure 3), who was also killed in 2012. The 
current leader of the IMU is Usman Gazi (Figure 4).  
93 Svante E. Cornell, “Narcotics, Radicalism, and Armed Conflict in Central Asia: The Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan,” Terrorism and Political Violence 17, no. 4 (2005): 619‒639.   
94 Ibid. 
95  Naumkin, 97.   
96 Svante, “Narcotics, Radicalism, and Armed Conflict in Central Asia: The Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan.”   
97 John C.K. Daly, “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Flirts with ISIS,” Silk Road Reporters, last 
modified October 13, 2014, http://www.silkroadreporters.com/2014/10/13/islamic-movement-uzbekistan-
flirts-isis/. 
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Figure 3.  Usman Adil, IMU leader.98 
 
 
Figure 4.  Usman Ghazi, current leader of the IMU.99 
Since September 11, the IMU activities have not been consistent. IMU, however, 
does show a capability to conduct terrorist acts. For example, in June 8, 2014, ten IMU 
fighters wearing suicide vests and armed with Kalashnikov rifles attacked and destroyed 
many fighter jets and American drones in the airport of Karachi, Pakistan. This attack left 
at least 39 dead, including the ten militants.100 Persistent Pakistani armed forces’ attacks 
98 “Usman Adil,” http://occident.blogspot.com/2010/09/in-pictures-waziristan-connections-ii.html. 
99 “Doen Fahri, “MuqawamanMedia, last modified June 14, 2014, http://muqawamah.com/pesan-dari-
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and other operations have kept the IMU incapable of gaining enough resources and 
opportunities. In September 29, the IMU leader Usman Gazi announced that his group 
had joined the Islamic State (IS), which is the most powerful terrorist organization today. 
In late September 2014, 17 members of the IMU were killed in the battleground of 
Syria.101   
B. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY  
Political institutions, alliances, and policy shifts can send signals that encourage 
or discourage collective action. There were changes in the external environment that led 
to specific changes in the opportunities available for social movement. This section will 
discuss political opportunities that helped or undermined the IMU’s chances for success. 
The first global opportunity was the collapse of the Soviet Union, followed by economic 
deprivation, and social alienation, which provided a fertile ground for the emergence of 
the social movement. The second, a more minor opportunity, was the civil war in 
Tajikistan. The radicalized Uzbeks tried to use these political opportunities, where the 
government became vulnerable and weak, against the pro-communist government.  
There are some stages that correspond to these political opportunities: 
• First, from 1980 to 1990, the people of Eurasia struggled. This period was 
associated with political ambiguity, low morale, and material deprivation 
before the collapse of the Soviet Union. People wanted to fill the gap in 
their lives, and found it in religion and customs, which the radicals 
provided.102  
• Second, during perestroika, Islamic organizations were unified against 
communism. However, later those organizations started to fight against 
political opponents to gain their place in the government. From that point, 
they became religious extremists and fundamentalists. Political spaces 
were filled by Islamic organizations, which were oriented by Wahhabis 
and fundamentalism.  
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C. ADOLAT PARTY AS A PREDECESSOR OF THE IMU  
Uzbekistan suffered like other Central Asian states from the Soviet system, and 
that only gave strength to Islamic radicalism. A group of young men led by two leaders 
of the Adolat (Justice) Party tried to participate in the political processes of Uzbekistan 
and propose goals to create an Islamic state under sharia rule. In 1990, Islam Karimov 
was elected president of Uzbek SSR. In 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed, and Karimov 
became the president of the independent Uzbekistan.103 This was a crisis period for 
Russia and its satellites, because economic conditions dwindled, unemployment 
increased, and the population needed support morally and economically. The Soviet 
Union no longer existed, but Central Asia’s problems were far from over.104 The 
weakened Uzbek state was a good target for the Adolat Islamists to expand their anti-
government campaign and establish an Islamic state. Poverty and unemployment 
drastically increased as high as 80 percent.105 In 1991 Adolat party members organized 
riots in Namangan. The angry mob had already seized the building of the local 
government, with a demand to meet with the president and declare Uzbekistan as an 
Islamic state.106 During that meeting in 1991, Yuldashev made Karimov give an oath that 
he would change the constitution of Uzbekistan, and incorporate norms of sharia law. 
Yuldashev insulted him in public, for which Karimov never forgave him.107 Karimov 
compromised with the public that then mostly supported the Islamic state. This demand 
was not met; however, and Karimov pursued repressive efforts. Uzbekistan is the country 
with an ungainly governmental system. This system makes impossible and illegitimate 
efforts by movements or groups to participate in formal policymaking and in their place 
chooses to repress them.108 Islam Karimov is the pro-communist President of Uzbekistan, 
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who has been ruling his country up to the present. He knows about Islamic groups’ 
threats, and that they would be a problem for his steered policy. His ideology could not 
accept that. Islamization in Uzbekistan has moved in parallel with Karimov’s de-
Islamization policy.109 He has targeted Islamic fundamentalist groups in the Fergana 
Valley. However, besides fundamentalists, many ordinary pious Muslims wrongly 
accused of being Salafists fell under these repressive campaigns. As a part of those 
repressions, in 1992 the Adolat was banned. As a predecessor of the IMU, the Adolat lost 
the opportunity to participate in the political process. Despite the crisis, Karimov could 
successfully target Islamists and put them on a short leash. These people, who did not 
accept the government policy, fled the country for Tajikistan, Iran, and Afghanistan.110 
Unsuccessful attempts by the Adolat to participate in the political process forced Juma 
Namangani to flee to Tajikistan, where the civil war started. Meanwhile, Yuldashev went 
to other Islamic states such Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, 
and Iran to seek financial and other support to take revenge on Karimov.111  
In 1992 Tajikistan felt under a civil war that continued until 1996. This civil war 
was the second opportunity for the IMU members. Namagani settled down in the 
Karategin Valley and Gorno-Badahshan, where he occasionally organized terrorist acts 
against the government forces. He had the Soviet paratrooper background, so he was 
valuable for Islamists, who fought against pro-Soviet Tajik forces.112 In 1996, exhausted 
from the civil war, Tajik opposition and the government sought to arrange a peace 
agreement. Namangani, who supported Tajik opposition, refused to accept a peace 
settlement, because he knew that it was his last opportunity on this territory. His logic 
follows the “frustration-aggression” approach where political violence and rebellion are 
tied directly to feelings of deprivation that arise out of unfulfilled expectations.113 
However, in 1997, the Tajik government compromised and signed an agreement with the 
109 R.C. Bobohanov, “Islam in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan,” Gulnarainanch, last modified February 24, 
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Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) that deprived Uzbek radical Islamists a last chance in 
this territory. Uzbek radicals failed a second time to use a political opportunity.114 The 
war between Uzbek Islamists and Karimov continued. In response to an Uzbek officer 
who was killed by Islamists in December 2, 1997, Karimov conducted an anti-religious 
campaign where religious leaders in Uzbekistan disappeared. The Uzbek government 
passed a Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations and banned 
unregistered mosques and madrasahs, most of which were located in Fergana Valley. Of 
4,200 mosques in Uzbekistan, 2,430 were located in Fergana Valley.115 Because it was 
unsafe to stay in Uzbekistan, with no support in Tajikistan, in 1998 Yuldashev and 
Namangani fled to Afghanistan and settled down in Kabul. Yuldashev was given a house 
by the Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar and Osama bin Laden. In summer 1998 
Yuldashev and Namangani, with support of Taliban and Al-Qaida leaders, announced the 
creation of the IMU.  
After the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, the U.S. and coalition forces 
started operations against the Taliban, where the IMU supported the Taliban and Al-
Qaida. The Taliban was defeated as well as the IMU, and their members fled Afghanistan 
to neighboring countries such as Pakistan.116 After its founding leaders were terminated 
the IMU leader became Osman Adil, who was also killed in 2012.117 The current IMU 
leader is Osman Gazi. The IMU has kept its main goals about establishing an Islamic 
state in Uzbekistan and Central Asia. However, by this time it has adjusted to a new 
environment. Its structure has changed from that of a spider to a starfish. This means that 
it has changed from being centralized organization to a decentralized one, which today 
operates in the FATAs of Pakistan and Afghanistan. IMU maintains it connection to Al-
Qaida and the Taliban. Terrorist acts that took place in 2008 in the Shapkadar district of 
Peshawar show that the IMU will use any opportunities and still has the strength to 
attack. The target of the attack was a Pashtun politician Afrasiab Hattak, who is a secular 
114 Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, 142. 
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ideologist. He was the only survivor of the attack, which killed 25 people.118 As the 
counterterrorism operation in the Swat region has revealed, many captured terrorists 
come from Central Asian countries. In September 2009 a convoy of Tajik forces was 
exposed to an attack by the terrorist group Jamaat Ansarulla, which had ties with the 
IMU.119 In this attack 23 government forces were killed. In the same year, in Hudjand 
city of Tajikistan, two suicide car bombers were killed, as well as one police officer, and 
30 people were injured. Ahmed Rashid contends: ‘Even though, the IMU has changed 
and has many small branches of groups, it has kept its ideas about a Central Asian 
Islamic state and seeks an opportunity to take advantage.”120  
D. MOBILIZING STRUCTURE 
In this section, we discuss the ability to mobilize support for the IMU through 
different formal and informal institutions, and external support. Leadership, connective 
structures, and operational cells (grassroots) contribute to the mobilizing structure.121 
Leaders are important vanguards of social movements, though not a main driving power. 
Many scholars argue that without leadership the structure of social movements become 
fragile and soon split.122 Yuldashev and Namangani played a vital role in forming the 
social movement. Mosques and madrasahs have legitimacy as institutional organizations 
where radical elements could penetrate. Salafism was not prevalent, but existed to the 
some degree in Fergana Valley. Salafist imams replaced many traditional imams, who 
were loyal to the government and propagated a traditional Islam.123 Converted Salafist 
disciples followed Rahmatulla Qari, Imam Abdul Ahad, who was a devoted Wahhabi and 
preached in the Ata Wali Khan Tura mosque in Namangan.124  
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Furthermore, the Soviet repressive regime played a contributing role. People were 
dissatisfied with the government, which did not care about people in the Fergana Valley. 
In the 1990s the Adolat Party, already led by Tahir Youldashev and Juma Namangani, 
served as a kind of replacement to corrupt and idle law-enforcement agencies. In 
addition, members of the Adolat started controlling local market prices.125 Those 
militants saw that local people started admiring them, especially when their acts were 
followed by religious speeches, tirades against inequality and the regime’s despotism, 
and calls for justice. Many young people started attending mosques and embraced 
Wahhabism and Salafism. Those mosques were located in Namangan, Margelan, Andijan 
and others places. As the militants began to grow in number, they received political 
support from foreign missionaries and preachers from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other Muslim countries.126 Many Arabs belonging to Al-
Qaida began to infiltrate the Fergana Valley, but their organizational work was not good 
enough to sustain the social movement. There was no unifying platform among militants, 
and the movement was followed by constant fragmentation. In addition, its ideological 
basis was weak and always contradicted traditional Islam. For example, in the late 1990s 
one of the Wahhabi youth groups who followed Imam Abdul Ahad from Gumbaz 
mosque in the Fergana Valley failed to support Yuldashev by refusing to take part in the 
political movement against the government.127 This refusal revealed that connective 
structures among the radical groups were weak, followed by a low level of solidarity.  
The most important role has been played by mosques. In 1990 Saudi’s money 
helped build new mosques and madrasahs in Namangan and the Fergana Valley.128 
Yuldashev’s trips to other Muslims countries helped him to build a network. At the same 
time, he had a connection with Pakistan Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) which helped run 
the Afghan war against the Soviets. The ISI willingly helped Yuldashev with provisions. 
The foreign support from other terrorist groups and diaspora from Saudi Arabia played a 
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vital role as well. At the end of the 1980s the number of Muslim people in Uzbekistan 
had increased. In fact, more than 90 percent of the population identified themselves as 
Muslims. Similarly, the number of mosques drastically increased from 300 in 1989 to 
6,000 in 1993.129 
The Adolat was active primarily in the Fergana Valley and Namangan. It is the 
most uncontrolled and religious places in that region, where representatives of three 
countries, including Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, share neighborhoods. It 
includes three districts of Kyrgystan (Jelal-abad–0.9 million people, Osh–0.9 million 
people, and Batkent–0.4 million), three districts of Uzbekistan (Namangan–1.8 million, 
Andijan–2.2 million, and Fergana–1.2 million), and Sogdian district of Tajikistan (2.0 
million people).130 Since the Fergana Valley is an isolated place, its socio-economic 
condition is poor due to overpopulation, and scarce water and land. The government 
regime controls this area only in repressive way, and has done nothing to improve 
people’s welfare or living conditions. These factors have generated resentment towards 
the government. The richest place among these districts was Sogdian; however, in recent 
years it has also been overcome by poverty. These conditions have been favorable to the 
Islamists, enabling them to mobilize recruits from among unemployed people by using 
framing processes. The Adolat tried to assist people by bringing up Islamic rule. Later, its 
members started using violent acts against not only government, but also the civilian 
population. For example, objects of the militants’ attack became the popular Islam 
incorporated with non-Islamic customs. Pre-Islamic rituals such as fire worship (a 
characteristic of Zoroastrianism, which was prevalent in the region), a dance of women 
near fire, and the Nouruz holiday have been practiced among the population for a long 
time.131 Traditional Islam has been the primary form in Central Asian since Islam was 
introduced.  
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The absence of solidarity and a strong indigenous network had a negative impact 
on mobilizing the masses. The number of supportive population declined.132 After several 
violent acts, the regime started repression, and many ordinary Muslims were abused. For 
example, in February 1999 the IMU members conducted several terrorist acts in Tashkent 
using explosive devices that killed 20 people.133 Indeed, Islamists underestimated 
Karimov, who gained strong support within the government and among some people, 
because he started to fight against terrorism. After unsuccessful attempts to mobilize 
members of the Adolat Party, they joined to continue activities in Tajik civil war. 
However, the Tajik government chose rational decision to compromise with Islamists.134  
After September 11, the IMU fled to Afghanistan and fought alongside the 
Taliban. In the same year, the IMU escaped to Pakistan together with Al-Qaida 
members.135 The IMU started to send radicalized members to neighboring Central Asian 
countries to indoctrinate and recruit more people through Islamic institutions. The second 
tactic that the IMU has used is indoctrination through female members. There are many 
legal and illegal migrants working in Kazakhstan, especially in Almaty, the former 
capital city. People who have come there rent apartments in groups of two and more 
people to make it easier to pay for housing. According to what female migrant workers 
living in Almaty said, unknown women came to their apartments and insisted they join 
the IMU.136 Those women were well trained in terms of convincing people, and they 
seem to better than men in recruiting, because they encourage more confidence. Thus, it 
seems that legitimate institutions and women are keys to mobilizing and recruiting 
efforts.   
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E. CULTURAL FRAMING  
In this section, framing processes were characterized by using diagnostic, 
prognostic, and motivational frames that help to shape the Islamic movement of 
Uzbekistan members’ ideology. The framing processes are vital to the mobilization 
process. In order to popularize ideology, the IMU frames messages in order to connect 
with a target audience. The predecessor of the IMU, the Adolat, used such framing 
processes as well. Yuldashev was an excellent orator, as people described him. He knew 
that religion was important for most of the Uzbek population, and through religion he 
could turn people against the government. In order to do that, he had to form the right 
ideology. He was an important figure, who had connections with his audience and like-
minded people.  
The IMU accused the Karimov regime of despotism and oppression calling them 
infidels. One of the leaders of the IMU, Tahir Yuldashev, explained:  
The goals of IMU activities are firstly fighting against oppression within 
our country, against bribery, against the inequities and also the freeing of 
our Muslim brothers from prison…. Who will avenge those Muslims who 
have died in the prisons of the regime? Of course, we will. We consider it 
our obligation to avenge them … We do not repent our declaration of 
jihad against the Uzbek government.137  
In his next message Yuldashev argued that the IMU was not involved in terrorist 
acts in Tashkent, and blamed the repressive regime and unfairness towards ordinary 
people: 
The IMU holds the ruling despotic regime fully responsible for the 
expositions that took place in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan, as these 
explosions are a logical outcome of the manifestly brutal and violent 
policy of Uzbek government towards its own people. The people, having 
no way to communicate with the government in peaceful language, had 
been forced to use a language that government could understand. The IMU 
believes that events that have fallen completely at the feet of the whole 
Uzbek people and especially the tyrannized youth are the manifestation of 
the deep-seated inner perceptions and therefore went completely out of 
control. It is also to be recalled that, aside from this, life inside the country 
137 Snow et al., “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation,” 
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is in absolute decline, while the despotic government in the prosecution of 
its policy finds itself in complete subservience to the dark force of the 
world. In this connection the IMU declares that there is no link whatsoever 
between the explosions in Tashkent and the Movement does not exclude 
objective reasons for what happened and makes the totalitarian regime 
responsible for the explosions, and draws attention to its fruitless activity 
in domestic and foreign policy.138  
The concept of Ghuraba was a one of the frames. Ghuraba (translated from the 
Arabic “Ghirab”) means “alien,” “foreigner.” This terminology first was proposed by one 
of the Islamists in Uzbekistan, who followed Wahhabism of Abduvali-Kori. His 
audiotapes were distributed as lessons of Islam to people. Later, Ghuraba was interpreted 
as “rogues.” Abduvali-Kori’s speeches were directed against secular Muslims who did 
not want to follow sharia law and followed their local traditions and customs. That kind 
of Islam was embraced by most Central Asians.139 Introducing the concept of radical 
ideology, Ghuraba caused division among Muslims. Using that, Adolat members created 
a basic ideology for the IMU, which later was broadened and assimilated with other 
ideologies of terrorist organizations.   
The prognostic frame explains the response and solution that Muslims have to 
take against aggressors and infidels. For example, the next Yuldashev message regarding 
the February 1999 Tashkent bombings asserted: 
The IMU believes that such events (unfairness and injustice) can be 
eradicated only in conditions of an independent Islamic regime after the 
overthrow of the cruel government that has fallen under the influence of 
outside imperial forces.140 
For Yuldashev, Islam is the solution. In the leaflets of the IMU that were 
distributed in Tashkent, Yuldashev mentioned: “Islam grants us the freedom of 
personality, directs us along the rightful path, and endows us with natural rights.141 Given 
economic difficulties in the region, he tried to show people that Islam was a key against 
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evil. Adolat members caught lawbreakers and publicly punished them according to sharia 
law. These kinds of acts started to change people’s minds about and relationship with the 
Adolat membership. Older people admired the Islamists’ actions that seemed to be right. 
The Islamists sent messages through speeches in mosques and madrasahs in Fergana 
Valley and Namangan, such as Gumbaz, Ata Wali Khan Tura, Saodat and Digrizlik.142 
These speeches have promoted the ideas that only Islam can save people from corruption 
and infidels, who are pro-communist people, and improve socio-economic conditions. 
For example, the Islamists caught a lawyer of the district and beat him making him 
apologize in front of people for “injustice” he had done.143 According to the first 
announcement of Adolat members, an Islamic state under sharia law must be created in 
order for people to attain a good life. Among the activities related to this goal, Yuldashev 
insisted people pray regularly, and women cover themselves with parandja (veils that 
cover from head to toes), forbidding them from wearing untraditional clothes.  
During the war in Chechnya, Yuldashev sent his next message of the IMU’s jihad 
to all Uzbekistani brethren, émigrés, and fighters for the faith in Chechnya: 
The argument ascribed to the IMU, that “jihad must be postponed” is 
absolutely deniable. We understand perfectly well that it is impossible to 
defeat the infidels without arms. However, the launching of such a large-
scale undertaking without a corresponding political, economic, and 
military preparation will inevitably cause unfounded losses. The infidel 
regime understands this quite well, too. Therefore, it is trying to create a 
political situation that could draw the Muslim into a premature struggle. 
The IMU is starting the armed struggle without hesitation. However, only 
its supreme leadership will determine the date and place. 
Brother mujahedeen let us draw conclusions from the events that passed. 
Let us not repeat our mistakes and let Allah give us the power to elevate 
the world of Allah, not only in Uzbekistan but also the world over; let Him 
strengthen our determination to build our Islamic Caliphate anew. 
Amin.144 
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The motivational frame is a component of framing processes and goes along with 
other diagnostic and prognostic frames. The Iranian revolution shows the importance of 
the motivational framing. Only disaffection with the regime was not sufficient to inspire 
people to risk their lives. A strong promise was important to overcome any fear that had 
ordinarily prevented people from joining the movement.”145 In this case, the motivational 
frame was also advocated by the IMU leader Yuldashev. Struggle against regime is 
portrayed as “the equivalent of holy war” and the concept of “martyrdom” has been used 
broadly, especially in the oath of the IMU.146 
A certificate of an oath performed during the passage of the IMU onto the path of 
jihad, in which the host of Allah demonstrates its physical and spiritual readiness to pick 
up the broken banner of Islam, as well as acknowledgment of the responsibility to 
liberate Muslim men and women from under the yoke: 
I, mujahed _______, have acquainted myself with the IMU statue and 
support it. 
In this struggle the IMU is in the forefront; as an active participant in the 
movement I undertake to obey the orders of Allah, his Prophet, IMU 
Commander-in-Chief Muhammad Tahir, and the commanders appointed 
by him without question. 
I swear, calling Allah and you to witness, to endure in the cause of jihad 
all the hardships, to fight to the last drop of blood; for the sake of reaching 
the lofty goal I am also prepared to become a Shahid (martyr). 
This section showed that the IMU recruits have already become martyrs and 
proved ready to sacrifice their lives for their commander-in-chief. They are very 
disciplined and devoted to their leaders. 
“Muslmanabad” (The Land of Islam) is the next frame. It is introduced by 
Rahmatulla Allama:  
First, Central Asia belongs to Muslim world, which is a homogeneous 
unified Muslim territory where Islam dominates everywhere; second, 
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Shari’a governs relations between individuals; third, all the people in this 
space believe in Allah and their society is ruled by the educated ‘ulama.147 
Failure to achieve their goals in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the Adolat members 
moved to Pakistan. Al-Qaida and the Taliban have become close allies against the West. 
Their leaders are ideologists. For example, Akbotaev Sherali worked in Kyrgyzstan and 
was an ideologist. He was one of the closest friends of Juma Namangani. The IMU 
member Usam Gazi was an ideologist also, before he became a leader. He could speak 
many languages, such as Arabic, Persian, Uzbek, and English and Russian depending on 
his audience, and was also educated in computer technology. He gave speeches during 
Islamic holidays, such as Orozo-Ayt and Kuran Ait, and called the public to jihad against 
NATO allies.148 The IMU has media that has translated the messages into many 
languages. The IMU also releases a magazine in Waziristan “Kabouilde nim gep (What Is 
Happening in Kabul).”149 IMU’s jihad was originally directed against Karimov’s regime. 
However, it has since changed. Every Muslim in Uzbekistan has to leave Uzbekistan and 
join his or her brothers, because the “infidel” government of Uzbekistan does not allow 
for Muslim to live in Uzbekistan in peace.150 As previously mentioned, one of the co-
founders of the IMU, Yuldashev, in his speech always talked about dying as a martyr for 
the jihad was a first goal for every Muslim.151 Most of the young men recruited traveled 
to Saudi Arabia for religious instruction. They acquired Arabic language and accepted 
Saudi’s funds to help them be “re-born” as a Muslim. Nevertheless, the created 
ideological structure was weak and that led to failure, because many people still 
embraced a traditional type of Islam (in the northern part of Uzbekistan).152  
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pervaya/3972. 
149 Rabbimov Kamollidin, “Ideology for Uzbek Jihadism,” Fergana News, last modified November 
22, 2011, http://www.fergananews.com/articles/7038.   
150 “Closer Look at the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,” Avesta.tj, last modified September 19, 
2013, http://www.avesta.tj/security/20475-pristalnyy-vzglyad-na-islamskoe-dvizhenie-uzbekistana.html.  
151 “Shahiyd Muhammad Tohir 2.” video, 10:09, posted by “quertyquerty,” August 27, 2010, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k9sTPHxhbq0. 
152 Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, 2. 
 42 
                                                 
F. CONCLUSION 
Based on past activities some conclusions can be made. In the first part of this 
chapter we discuss and assess political opportunity for the IMU. As the Adolat Party, 
IMU had an opportunity to overthrow the Karimov regime. It failed to do so, however, 
because Karimov controlled everything in Uzbekistan, including the media and religious 
organizations. Thus, the Islamists could not take advantage of this first political 
opportunity. The civil war in Tajikistan gave them a second opportunity to take control of 
Tajikistan, then Uzbekistan. However, exhausted from war the Tajik government and 
Tajik opposition achieved a peace agreement. With no chance of another political 
opportunity, the IMU moved to the FATAs in Pakistan and Afghanistan.   
Leadership of the IMU played an important role in establishing the group, and in 
recruitment. Leaders tried to attract people into the group by showing its faithful acts 
against government injustice. Punishing people who break the sharia law gave people 
more confidence about the group. Especially the group gained popularity among 
respected elders. Using a crisis—the collapse of the Soviet Union—the Adolat Party 
promised people a better life. Realizing that the Uzbek government was not going to 
compromise, though, Adolat members started to commit terrorist acts in which many 
civilians were killed, especially in Tashkent’s terrorist attacks in 1999. There was a 
propaganda war between the Karimov regime and Yuldashev over these terrorist acts, 
which the Karimov regime eventually won. He won because he controlled all media. 
Besides the Adolat members had many misunderstanding within their group and with 
representatives of traditional Islam, which made mobilization even harder. Mobilization 
for the IMU finished unsuccessfully.  
Cultural framing was supported by diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational 
framings. The IMU declared that the government is despotic and acts unjustly toward its 
people. IMU leadership sent many messages to local people in order to gain support. 
Their main framings—Islam is the solution, creation of Muslmanabad, Ghuraba, and the 
concept of martyrdom—supported calling for jihad. However, since the government 
controlled all media, it was impossible to conduct a propaganda campaign in Uzbekistan.  
 43 
To conclude, first, the IMU promoted a clearly puritanical type of Islam based on 
Salafism. Second, it had control primarily in the Fergana area. Third, the IMU tried to 
show that Islamists were able to eliminate the roots of corruption, but they failed.153 
Fourth, Islamists attempted to show that everyone is socially equal in comparison to 
government leaders. Finally, the IMU called for the creation of an Islamic state based on 
sharia rule. The leaders wanted to seize power by force, which showed irrationality on the 
part of the leaders and distorted messages about pure Islam. Many of their terror attacks 
led to civilian casualties. In response, people started to incline towards the repressive 
Karimov regime, rather than the more brutal Islamists. Thus, the IMU eroded its own 
credibility in front of the supportive masses, and lost their support. These conditions 
forced the IMU to move out of the country and reorganize in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It 
has since joined with the Islamic State, the most powerful terrorist organization in the 
world, armed with modern weaponry and strong propaganda.  
153 Matthew Stein, “The Goals of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Its Impact on Central Asia 
and the United States,” Foreign Military Studies Office, 
http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/IMU-Goals.pdf.      
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IV. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. RESEARCH SUMMARY: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
This thesis examines and analyzes the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan through 
social movement theory and evaluates the IMU’s threat to Kazakhstan. The first chapter 
introduces the framework and provides a brief explanation about the thesis. The second 
chapter starts with a literature review and traces the emergence of radical Islam in Central 
Asia in the context of the history of Islam in Central Asia. This chapter also discusses the 
concept of SMT, especially explaining the differences between themes. Next, each 
variable such as political opportunity, mobilizing structure, and cultural framing is 
discussed individually. There are many models of SMT, such as the classical model and 
recourse mobilization, but they are not able to cover all aspects of a particular group. For 
example, the classical model only includes a psychological approach and distances itself 
from a political one. Resource mobilization theory covers mobilization processes, but the 
formal organizational manifestation of these processes and their physical aspects are not 
considered.154 Finally, it becomes clear that the better model is the political process 
model. This model considers the perspective of both SMT models, and also considers that 
movements represent a long-term process, rather than many separate developmental 
levels.155  
The IMU is represented through the SMT in order to analyze and evaluate its 
threat. This part starts from its formation as a group of youths, who establish a political 
party, and later transform it into a terrorist group. There were some conditions, such as 
the economic and moral deprivations of the society and political ambiguity, which 
provided a political opportunity to the group. Yet the Uzbek state’s brutal repression of 
Islamists, did not give a chance for revolution, and many ordinary Muslims were 
persecuted under the government response. President Karimov closed any political 
opportunity in the country to prevent activity against the government.  
154 McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements.    
155  McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency.   
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Mobilization became productive when youth merely started its movement, when 
“Islamists” helped locals to eradicate injustice by fighting against the government. Local 
support waned, however, when Islamists started using violence against the innocent 
population. In terms of framing process, Islamists use their oath and concepts, such as 
Ghuraba, Islam as the solution, martyrdom, and Holy War. However, these techniques do 
not work effectively in a state where the government is repressive and has no tolerance 
toward Islamists.   
Although the IMU failed as a social movement in Uzbekistan, it succeeded after 
moving to Pakistan and Afghanistan. In these locations, IMU became a decentralized 
terrorist group. We can say it succeeds, because it still conducts terrorist acts in Pakistan 
and fights in cooperation with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which represents 
a threat to Central Asian countries.   
Research strengths: There is much information about the period of time when 
the IMU existed as a political party called Adolat; Internet sites can be found in many 
different languages, such as Kazakh, Uzbek, English, and Russian, which give more 
opportunity to conduct research; research was also based on the experiences of this 
researcher and his friends in Uzbekistan.  
Research weaknesses: Data analysis requires more time; there is some uncertain 
information which requires confirmation by conducting a survey in the researched region. 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The IMU is a well-organized and decentralized terrorist group today. Although its 
current membership consists of different nationalities, including Pashtuns, it still keeps its 
name that relates to Uzbekistan.156 Regardless of it being expelled from Uzbekistan, the 
IMU is still active and capable of attacks, as shown by the terrorist act in Karachi airport, 
which took the lives of nine suicide bombers and at least 18 Pakistani citizens, including 
156 Mendkovich, Nikita, “What is the IMU?” last modified October 22, 2010, http://navoine.info/chto-
takoe-idu.html.    
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security forces.157 Recently, the IMU members declared they support ISIS and would 
cooperate with ISIS in order to promote “The Islamic Caliphate.” In fact, during a U.S. 
attack on ISIS in September of this year, 17 IMU members were killed.158 It is known 
that the IMU is comprised of many nationalities, and there is a concern about what would 
happen if those terrorists returned to their countries. Would they live as they had lived 
before joining IMU, or would they start a new jihad? Since the IMU continues to exist 
and thrive, future studies need to address ways in which to fight and terminate it.  
C. POLICY IMPLEMENTATIONS 
This section suggests how the Kazakhstan government can address policy 
implementation on the assumption of empirical evidence. Recent terrorist acts have 
shown the Kazakh government was ready to repel any kind of terrorist threat; however, 
the government still lacks the capacity to respond properly to threats posed by terrorism. 
With respect to the government, it should profoundly understand the concept of terrorism, 
as well as the role of counterterrorism units and what they are designed for. They need to 
attain high professionalism, and modernize equipment and weapons. Modern 
unconventional warfare against terrorism requires modern weaponry and qualified special 
operators. Enhancing intelligence operations also plays a crucial role in preventing any 
kind of terrorist threat.  
1. Exchange between Different Government Agencies 
Immigration bureaus, the National Security Committee (NSC) of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and 
other security force elements should have effective information sharing, monitoring, and 
supervision of suspicious Kazakhstani people, domestically as well as overseas. 
157 Murat Sadykov, “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Claims Karachi Airport Attack,” 
EURASIANET.org, last modified July 11, 2014, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/68526.  
158 “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Joins ISIS,” Vestnik Kavkaza, last modified October 6, 2014, 
http://vestnikkavkaza.net/news/politics/60716.html.     
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2. Exchange on Databases with Neighboring Countries  
Cooperation with neighboring countries is very important because of the effect of 
teamwork. There are many regions that reflect a terrorism threat, such the western and 
eastern parts of Kazakhstan, and the Xingjian Uighur Autonomous Region. Nevertheless, 
the southern region of the Kazakhstan is more vulnerable to terrorist threats from 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Cooperation with the United States counterinsurgency 
institutions continues, and it must be more productive. Sharing information with 
neighboring countries such as Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and 
Russia would give more advantages in disrupting extremist and terrorist groups.   
3. No Concessions to Terrorists and Legislation 
The Kazakh government should give no concessions to terrorists. It must not pay 
ransom, release prisoners, or make other concessions that encourage terrorists. Terrorists 
who conducted fatal acts must be executed in order to warn others. Furthermore, families 
of terrorists must be held responsible for their family member. If a family member is 
detained in relation to terrorism, his or her family must pay a fine of a certain amount of 
money or property confiscation. This may encourage people to think twice before 
committing violence.  
4. 2013‒2017 Counterterrorism Program  
On October 2, 2013, the Kazakh president approved a state program to fight 
religious extremism and terrorism for the period of 2013 through 2017.159 This program 
is well-organized, and in future this strategy may work very well. However, while 
targeting extremists and terrorist ideology, the state should distinguish between 
traditional Islam and radical forms, and should not target all at once. Wrong targeting of 
religious institutions also causes problems.  
159 “Kazakhstan New Counter-Terrorism and Anti-Extremism Strategy,” last modified on September 
14, 2013, http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=31451218.  
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D. FINAL ANALYSIS AND PROGNOSIS  
As we see from empirical evidence, my conclusion is that the IMU is a real threat 
to Kazakhstan. In the 1990s before the Soviet Union collapsed, regimes were able to 
control Islamists groups in some states. In some states the collapse of the Soviet Union 
ended up with civil war followed by the killing of innocents. This time was lessons to 
learn for states, and experience to gain for radical Islamists. Islamists lost their battle, but 
not the war. The war against terrorism still continues, and today terrorist groups become 
more modernized and experienced.  
The IMU recently has joined with ISIS, but what does that mean? It means that 
the IMU has support, and the main weapon in modern warfare is strong propaganda. 
Without propaganda, any terrorist group would just be considered a group of bandits, of 
no interest to anyone. 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan still have depressed economic conditions, 
high unemployment, and an increasing level of religiosity. These are not the main reasons 
for terrorism, but some of the contributors. These factors change people’s mind towards a 
government. These conditions are prevalent not only in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and 
Kyrgyzstan, but also to some degree in Kazakhstan. Although Kazakhstan’s economic 
situation is better than in neighboring states, there are people who are dissatisfied with 
the government—and vice versa. When the number of dissatisfied people exceeds that of 
the satisfied, a political crisis may occur. A political crisis is often a good opportunity for 
radical groups to recruit, to expand, and to escalate the situation even more in order to get 
rid of the existing regime and establish an Islamic Caliphate. Besides, after Kazakhstan 
gained independence, the number of religious people started drastically growing. 
Salafism and Wahhabism also became active, which was confirmed by the terrorist acts 
that happened in 2011.  
IMU members already conduct indoctrination in strong states like Russia and 
China (in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region). Although leaders of the Central 
Asian states conduct activities against terrorism, they remain skeptical about the coming 
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threat. Every state wants to protect itself alone, which is not going to work well. Terrorist 
groups are uniting, which makes them powerful, why should not we? 
If needed precautions are not be taken into serious consideration and further 
implementation, it is obvious to me that by the middle of 2015, Central Asia could 
become a platform for a “Central Asian Spring,” where the IMU may play a vanguard 
role.   
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